Page 25 - the SyI Quarterly 14 Booklet Format
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             A holistic approach is required to address increasing threat profiles and determine defensive
             strategies and mutual collaboration across sectors.
             Mutual support therefore must be:
             •  Industry sectors working together
             •  “Wider family”
             •  Sharing information...and intelligence/ Sharing ‘Best Practice’
             •  Security measures
             •  Legislation options e.g., Injunctions
             •  Media communications

             I cannot stress the Importance of public understanding and to support those being targeted!
             How can we as professionals do this?
             •  Create & train Business Resilience Teams
 That leads us to pose the question –so who is in   Challenges in post-Brexit Europe?  •  Review & develop effective relationships with Police
 that target environment? Anyone may -and can be   Local Police   Review all risk & security plans in detail…
 -defined as a ‘stakeholder’ target  •  Investigations often limited / reactive after the crime  •  Keep key stakeholders -
 •  Staff  •  Incidents treated in isolation rather than linked.  •  informed
 •  Shareholders  •  involved
 •  Customers  National Police   •  protected
 •  Financial institutions  •  Incident data collation / intelligence sharing limited   •  supported
 •  Suppliers  •  Resistant to concept as national or international
 •  Families…  issue  For sectors and organisations having to deal with activism…
 •  Intelligence collection not a priority of National   Monitor the extremist environment and instigate Risk-based, protective security measures for:
 ….and anything a stakeholder may be associated with  Policing Plans  •  Company sites
 •  Directorships, Memberships  •  Linking of crime not identified / limited crime   •  At-risk’ employee/ stakeholder homes
 •  Schools, Community Organisations, Golf Clubs,   disruption
 Pubs…       Events (AGM’s, product launches, conferences)
 European Law Enforcement    Ensure Stakeholder Awareness
 The tactics are widely shared across the protestor   •   Operational Analysis can be limited by inconsistent   •  A measure, proportionate tactical response to incidents
 spectrum:  incident data   •  Consider Legal remedies – civil injunctions
 •  Home Targeting  •   Impaired by lack of political engagement
 •  Letter campaigns  •  Can be difficult to ensure consistency in Europe   Work with the media every time…ideally never against: Be VERY proactive with the media….and
 •  Junk /threatening mail  for intelligence collection, disruption, arrests, and   always, always respond! (they’ll run the story anyway – so ensure your point of view is heard)
 •  Threatening phone calls  prosecutions
 •  Home demonstrations     The stance is always…Communicate, Communicate, Communicate…to customers, shareholders,
 •  Damage to homes  Worth also noting that Extremism of course does not   employees, community…any person or group that could be construed as a stakeholder. Be
 •  Incendiary devices  have to self-regulate!  honest, consistent, caring and... open!
 •  Conference disruption
 •  Infiltration – expose  So, how to defend yourself? The activist target   In summary, what lessons should we take from past and present campaigns?
 •  Company AGMs disrupted  should seek – where possible – the following:  •  Political support is always vital
 •  ‘Mobile’ demonstrations  •  Government engagement   •  Be transparent
 •  Pop-up demonstrations   •  Public support for research  •  Co-operate with the media
 •  Economic sabotage  •  Political Support   •  A social media strategy is essential
 •  Targeting financiers, suppliers etc  •  appropriate legislation  •  Importance of the public, where possible, being “on-side”
 •  Cyber disruption attacks  •  consistent policing  •  Support those in your sector who are subject to activism and extremism!
 •  “Lock-On’s”  •  Judicial /CPS awareness
 •  Locks super glued  •  Appropriate sentencing
 •  Hoax Bombs and/or threats
 •  Targeting overseas affiliates
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