Page 28 - the SyI Quarterly 8

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Furthermore, regarding Afghanistan and Mali,
these cases accounted for the longest periods
held in captivity (five years and five-and-a-half
years respectively). This suggests that the longer a also incorporated a ransom of a significant sum
hostage is held, the more likely they are of being
released.
The POL videos varied in length from 12 seconds
to almost 19 minutes. The longer videos tended
to involve a much more advanced production,
incorporating propaganda and news footage from where only a government would be able to pay
a political dimension.
In terms of outcome, there was no difference
whether the hostages were shown alone or
together (in cases where multiple hostages were
taken).
14% of the sample in the POL videos were shown
as on their knees in a pleading state. Of note, all
hostages in these videos were killed.
JNIM in Mali were noted to have significantly
improved their POL productions in the last six
years to a very professional output. It is unknown
whether this is a strategic imperative or could
be answered by access to better equipment and
applications that are now available.
It was rare to see hostage-takers delivering
a narrative alone and without the hostage in
view. Only two cases from the sample fitted this
category. They were both ISIS videos from Syria
cases and depicted the same hostage-taker. Both
cases ended in death.
39% of the sample analysed involved armed and
masked hostage-takers being depicted in the
videos. Of those, 75% ended in the death of the
hostages.
Half of the videos involved at least one hostage
being killed.
Discussion
The results identify a causal relationship albeit
a significant positive relationship. It should be
apparent to the reader that this will be taken
into context within the whole context of the
investigation and circumstances at that particular
time. Political relationships and snapshots in
time play an important part of any response
mechanisms as well.
The content analysis characteristics add to
the understanding of investigators. Demands
were predominantly directed at governments
(92%) and were political in nature. Significant
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amounts of demands were for the swap of
prisoners. Therefore, there is a high likelihood
that a terrorist organisation will make demands
towards governments. A ¼ of the demands
(i.e. millions). Two points are worthy of note
regarding the payment of ransoms. Firstly, they
are generally never paid at the opening offer and
will be reduced by negotiation. Secondly, all of
these demands are in the region of what is known
in the trade as an ‘unrealistic demand’; that is one
due to the size of the demand. Empirical evidence
suggests that both sides know it is illegal to pay
ransoms to terrorist groups in any event, so it is
possible that the hostage takers’ intention is to
demand an unrealistic amount and then use this
as justification to kill. This tends to suggest that
a realistic demand (i.e. money) would probably
signal an intent to release the hostage whereas
something totally unrealistic (i.e. US out of Iraq)
would lead to death.
Positioning was another factor of note. All POL
videos examined where the hostage was filmed
kneeling were killed. This would tend to suggest
that where a POL video is shown and the hostage
is filmed on their knees (and in a pleading,
submissive manner), that the outcome may be
more likely to be death.
The majority of videos showed the hostages
alone. Where the hostage-takers were seen in
the videos then there was found to be a higher
likelihood of death as the outcome.
The study did find a relationship between death
as an outcome with the hostage taker(s) shown
in the video, weapons pointed at the hostages,
deadlines being given (for the demands), threats
made and the wearing of orange jump suits.
Again, a significant proportion of the video
containing hostages wearing orange jumpsuits
were from the ISIS videos, with one further in an
Iraqi POL video.